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[L. A. No. 28185. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1965.]

\
I

CREST CATERING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE SU- I,
PERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; CARL KIRSTEN, Real Party in Interest.
II
[1] Discovery-l1nder Statutory Procedures-Privileged Matters.
-Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 1094, 2111, providing that information
furnished to the Department of Employment by an employing
nnit shall not be open to the public or admissible in evidence
in any action or special proceeding, manifest a clear legislative
purpose to preserve the confidentiality of information submitted to the Department of Employment.
[2] Id.-l1nder Statutory Procedures-Privileged Matters.-Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 1094, 2111, providing that information furnished to the Department of Employment by an employing unit
shall not be open to the public or admissible in evidence in any
action or special proceeding, not only make such material
privileged at a trial, but also make it immune from discovery
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Discovery, Inspection, Mental and Physical
Examination, § 5; Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection (rev. ed.
§§ 15-17).
McX. Dig. References: [1-3] Discovery, § 7; [4] Waiver, §§ 4,5•
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in view of Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (b), making matters
privileged against disclosure at a trial likewise privileged
against disclosure through any discovery procedure.
[Sa, Sb] Id.-Under Statutory Procedures-Privileged MattersWaiver.-An employer waived its privilege against disclosure
of its employment tax returns under discovery proceedings,
instituted by the administrator of an employee welfare and
retirement fund to. aseertain the eorrect amount due to the
fund by the employer, by becoming bound by a welfare fund
trust agreement providing that the employer shall promptly
furnish all necessary information on demand to those entrusted
with the operation and administration of the fund, where
inspeetion of the tax returns was made necessary by the
destruction by fire of the employer's payroll reeords, and
where the employer, during audits of the fund for other years,
opened its books and records, ineluding in one instance eopies
of its employment tax returns, for audit and inspection by
the fund administrator.
[4] Waiver-Requisites-ltnowledge and Intent: Acts ConstitutiDg.-A waiver may occur by an intentional relinquishment or
as the result of an act which, according to its natural import,
is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to
induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to prohibit the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County and Philbrick McCoy~ Judge
thereof, from enforcing an order to produce for inspection
copies of quarterly employment tax returns. Alternative writ
discharged and peremptory writ denied.
Epport & Delevie and Victor M. Epport for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward M. Belasco
and Herschel T. Elkins, Deputy Attorneys General, Mitchell,
Silberberg & Knupp and Howard S. Smith as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
James H. De~ison and Edward S. Stutman for Real Party in
Interest.

,

Harry Graham Balter, Bledsoe, Smith, Cathcart, Johnson
& Rogers and Robert A. Seligson as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Real Party in Interest.
[4] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Waiver, § 3; Am.Jur., Waiver (1st ed §§ 14,
15).
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Carl Kirsten, as administrator of·.
Employee Welfare and Retirement Fund and as assignee
the trustees of the fund, brought an action against
Catering Company to compel payment of contributions ..~'''.. -''''
edly owed to the fund under the terms of a contract with a
labor union. He alleged that in June 1957 Crest orally agreed,
with the union to make contributions to the fund at' specified
hourly rates for each hour worked by each of its employees and'
to be bound by the terms of certain trust instruments establishing the fund. He also alleged that Crest failed to make
a full and complete accounting of its indebtedness under the
contract.
During discovery proceedings, Kirsten directed interrogatories to Crest as to the number of employees and the hours
worked by each during the period in issue in order to ascertain
the correct amount due under the alleged contract. When
Crest responded that all its books and records had been destroyed by fire. Kirsten suggested that Crest obtain the requested information from copies of its employment tax returns. The completeness and accuracy of Crest's answers to
several sets of interrogatories became the subject of a sharp
and acrimonious dispute. On Kirsten's motion the court
ordered Crest to produce for inspection copies of its quarterly
returns submitted to the California State Department of Employment and to the federal agencies. Crest then filed this petition for a writ to prohibit enforcement of the order on the
ground that copies of its employment tax returns filed with
the Department of Employment are privileged under sections
1094 and 2111 of the Unemployment Insurance Code. 1
Section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a
party may be ordered to produce for inspection "any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged . .. " which relate to
pending litigation. (Italics added.)
With exceptions not here relevant, section 1094 of the
Unemployment Insurance Code provides that the information
deliveted to the Department of Employment by an employing
unit "shall be for the exclusive use and information of the
lIt is not contended that the information submitted to the federal
agencies would be privileged under federal law. (See cases cited in 70
A.L.R.2d 237 at pp. 244 and 246.) In Webb v. Standard Oil Co. (1957)
49 Cal.2d 509, 513·514 [319 P.2d 621J, however, we refused to permit in·
spection of federal tax returns if the information contained therein would
be deemcd privileged under state law. Accordingly, the propriety of the
discovery order as it relates to the fedcrnl returns depends upon whether
it would impinge on the privilege with respect to state returns.
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director ... and shall not be open to the public, nor admissible
in evidence in any action or special proceeding..•. " Section
2111 provides that the information .. is confidential and shall
not be published or open to public inspection in any manner
... " and declares that any employee of the department who
violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
[1] These provisions manifest a clear legislative purpose
to preserve tIle confidentiality of information submitted to the
Department of Employment. (See Webb v. Standard Oil Co.
(1957) 49 Ca1.2d 509, 513 [319 P.2d 621].)
Amici curiae contend that we should re-examine the holding
in the Webb case in the ligllt of St. Regis Paper Co. v. United
States (1961) 368 U.S. 208, 218 [82 S.Ct. 289, 7 L.Ed.2d 240],
which held that statutes substantially tIle same as those considered in the Webb case did not create a privilege. Following
the St. Regis case, however, Congress amended the relevant
statutes to abrogate the rule of that ease. Moreover, unlike
the statutes considered in the Webb ease,' sections 1094 and
2111 leave no room for doubt that they create a privilege. Indeed, in the St. Regis opinion itself, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that statutes similar to sections 1094 and 2111
created a privilege. (368 U.S. at p. 218.) We are therefore not
persuaded that we should re-examine the holding in the Webb
case.
[2] There is also no merit in Kirsten's contention that
tht>-se sections do not make the information immune from discovery but merely make it privileged at the trial. Section
2016, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly
provides that "All matters which are privileged against
disclosure upon the trial under the law of this State are
privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure.... '0
[3a] We agree, however, with Kirsten '8 contention that
Crest waived its right to assert the privilege.
In its contract with the union, Crest agreed to be bound
'In Webb v. Standard Oil 00. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509 [819 P.2d 621], we
were ealled upon to interpret sections 19282 and 19283 of the Revenue
and Taxatioh Code. Section 19282 provides: •• Except as otherwise provided . . . it is a misdemeanor for the Franchise .Tax Board, nny
deputy, agent, clerk, or other offieer or employee, to disclose in any
manner information as to the a'mount of ineome or any particulars set
forth or disclosed in any report or return required under this part."
Section 19283 provides: .. Such infommtioll may be disclosed in accordance with proper judicial order in cases or actions instituted for the
enforcement of this pnrt or for the prosecution of violations of this
pa.rt. o,

)
278

CREsT

CATERING CO.t!. SUPERIOR CoURT

by the trust agreement that governs the WeHare and
ment Fund. Section 4.07 of that agreement provides: 4, Each·
employer covered hereby shall assist in the preparation and
cooperate in the execution of any and all forms, applications
or other data necessary in the establishment and operation of . .
the Plan and Fund, and in this connection shall promptly t_r.
nish all necessary information _pon demand to the Trustees
or the Administrator entrusted with the operation and ad.
ministration of the Plan and Fund. " (Italics added.)· Section
4.08 provides: "To facilitate the Trustees' determination of
full and complete reporting, the Trustees may, within their
discretion, assign an auditor at the expense of the Fund (and
not at the expense of either the Employers' Council or the
Union) to audit the payrolls for the sole purpose of determin.
ing the correct amount of contributions owed the Funds..•. "
Crest contends that the foregoing provisions do not waive
the privilege because there is no specific reference either to the
code provisions creating the privilege or to the tax returns.
A waiver does not depend upon meeting such a brittle requirement. In Torbensen v. Family Life Insurance Co. (1958) 163
Cal.App.2d 401, 404 [329 P.2d 596], the court was called upon
to determine whether a clause in an application for a life in1;urance policy operated to waive the doctor-patient privilege.
The clause in question stated: 4' To whom it may concern:
I hereby authorize and request you to disclose any and all
information and records concerning my condition when under
observation by you, if requested to do so" by the life insurance
company. Even though no reference was made either to the
particular code provision involved or to the particular privilege
involved, the court found that the applicant waived the
privilege.
[4] A waiver may occur (1) by an intentional relinquishment or (2) as "the result of an act which, according to its
natural import, is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the
right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been
relinquished." (Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States (1962) 57
Ca1.2d 621, 626 [21 Cal.Rptr. 802, 371 P.2d 578].)
. [3b] Crest's promise to "!urnish all necessary information
upon demapd" meets the first test enunciated in the Rheem
case. Although the employment tax returns might not be
classified as 4' necessary information" were the payrolls available, the destruction of the payrolls left the tax returns as the
only source of the information required to be furnished by the
trust agreement. Inspection of copies of the tax returns is
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clearly •• necessary" under these circumstances. Crest proposes
that we interpret section 4.07 of the trust agreement as requiring it to furnish all necessary information unIe88 the same
be privileged. The language of section 4.07, however, is clear
and explicit and does not limit Crest's obligation.
Furthermore, Crest's actions during two prior audits for
other years not only illustrate its awareness of the broad scope
of section 4.07, but meet the second test enunciated in the
Bheem case. On those occasions Crest opened its books and
records, including in one instance copies of its employment
tax returns, for audit and inspection by Kirsten and made
substantial payments found to be owing as a result of those
.
audits.
The conclusion that Crest waived the privilege is buttressed
by the fact that the payrolls and the tax returns contain
basically the same information. Had Crest's payrolls not been
destroyed by tire, no claim of privilege could have been raised
to prevent Kirsten from invoking his rights under section 4.08
to obtain access to those records. The same information does
not become less obtainable merely because it is written on a
governmental form. (ToZlefsen v. Phillips (D.C. Mass. 1954)
16 F.R.D. 348, 349. See also Connecticut Importing Co. v.
ContinentaZ Distilling Corp. (D.C. Conn. 1940) 1 F.R.D. 190,
192; Paramount Film Distnouting Corp. v. Bam, (D.C. E.D.
8.C.1950) 91 F.Supp. 778, 781; and Beetlesv. Pennsylvania B.
Co. (D.C. Del. 1948) 80 F.Supp. 107, 108-109; (keyhound
Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 355, 397 [15 Cal.Rptr. 90,
364 P.2d 266].)
The alternative writ is discharged, and the peremptory writ
is denied.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J. and Burke, J.,
concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would grant the writ of prohibition for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Herndon in the
opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal
(Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court (Cal.App.) 40 Cal.
Rptr.588).
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